

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC No. 02473-86
20 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: George Kolt
National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: US Forces and Political Environment in Germany Today

1. In a very thoughtful recent cable (attachment 1), Ambassador Rick Burt has expressed his concern about the increased isolation of the US community in Germany brought about by defensive measures against terrorism (e.g. stringent controls at all US military installations, cancellations of some US-German events, etc). This hidden cost imposed on the West by terrorist groups comes at a time when a disturbingly high number of Germans were already coming to view the US military in their country as a presence that must be tolerated rather than actively supported in its mission. This unhappy coalescence of two developments--German apathy towards US troops and isolation brought about by the terrorist threat--is an issue that deserves attention and that you may want to discuss with National Security principals here and with the US Commanders in Europe [redacted]

25X1

2. Ambassador Burt's point is self-explanatory. Relations between the US military and the German population are a more complex issue that was recently explored by DDI/EURA analyst [redacted] as part of the Exceptional Analyst Program [redacted]. In brief he found that, although Germany continues to see the Allied military presence as necessary and to accept the everyday discomforts associated with it (such as aircraft noise, maneuver traffic and use of the countryside for training), the trends are disturbing:

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- Attitudes are becoming polarized with SPD members and the younger generation on the critical side.
- A number of people are supportive only as long as allied military activities do not impose a burden on them.

ALL paragraphs are
classified S/NF.

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERV MULTIPLE


~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

- Insidious reporting by some of the media and "anti-military" activities by some teachers are creating an unfavorable climate, which some SPD and Green activists have used to proclaim local ABC-weapons-free zones.
- Faced with a federal and a number of state governments that prefer to remain distant from sticky everyday civil military issues, US forces are having to carry more of the public relations burden and, in some cases, to refrain from desirable land acquisitions or deployments.




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The greatest danger of all of these developments is that they will not only feed on each other, but could also create a dynamic in which some politicians on both sides of the Atlantic come to engage in recriminations and lose sight of our mutual security interests. Disagreements over Libya and counterterrorism, security measures only increase the danger.



25X1

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George Kolt".

George Kolt

Attachment:

1. Bonn 15344



25X1

NIC No.
19 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
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National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: US Forces and Political Environment in Germany Today

Distribution:

1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - D/DCI-DDCI/Ex.Staff
1 - ER
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1 - Acting C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/EURA
1 - EURA/EI/SI []
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SECRET/NOFORN

MSGNO 11 (STXX) *05/15/86* *16:12:18.3.0*
ZCZC 21:10:17Z (ST)
EMI DTG : 86051515534504

SECRET

STATE

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TOR: 151900Z MAY 86

NC 0885191
BONN 15344

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UTS6738
PP RUEHC RUEHDD
DE RUFHOL #5344/01 1351405
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151405Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0983
INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
BT

EZ1:

S E C R E T BONN 15344

EZ2:

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BURT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, GE, XT, US

SUBJECT: CAN THE U.S. BE BOMBED OUT OF WESTERN EUROPE?
(S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

1. IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE BERLIN DISCO BOMB-
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AMERICAN OFFICIALS WAS THAT WE CANNOT ALLOW THE UNITED
STATES TO BE BOMBED OUT OF WESTERN EUROPE. YET THE
SECURITY MEASURES WE AND THE U.S. MILITARY HAVE HAD TO
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USG PRESENCE ABROAD ARE ALL CONTRIBUTING TO THE POSSI-
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IN WESTERN EUROPE MAY INDEED BE DIMINISHED. THIS IS A
RISK I BELIEVE WE NEED TAKE SERIOUSLY.

2. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BERLIN BOMBING, U.S. MILITARY

S E C R E T

AUTHORITIES, WITH MY ENCOURAGEMENT, SUBSTANTIALLY STEPPED UP ALREADY TIGHT PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES. WE HAVE DONE THE SAME. GERMAN AUTHORITIES HAVE GIVEN US TREMENDOUS SUPPORT, AND DEVOTED EXTRAORDINARY MANPOWER AND OTHER RESOURCES TO OUR PROTECTION. ONE UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE MEASURES, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN TO FURTHER ISOLATE THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN COMMUNITIES FROM EACH OTHER AND MAKE PERSONAL CONTACT, PARTICULARLY AT THE LOWER LEVELS, MORE DIFFICULT.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, AS WE KNOW, AMERICANS HAVE BEEN STAYING AWAY FROM EUROPE IN DROVES. AS A RESULT, MANY GERMAN-AMERICAN EVENTS -- LOCAL FRIENDSHIP WEEKS, PROFESSIONAL AND ARTISTIC AND EVEN MAJOR BUSINESS GATHERINGS -- HAVE HAD TO BE CANCELLED OR SIGNIFICANTLY MODIFIED. THE DROP IN AMERICAN TOURISM IS UNDOUBTEDLY PUTTING USEFUL PRESSURE ON WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MORE SERIOUSLY. ANY LONG-TERM DIMINUTION IN THESE TYPES OF TRANS-ATLANTIC CONTACT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A VERY HIGH PRICE TO PAY.

4. WE ARE OURSELVES NOW GOING THROUGH AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHETHER AND HOW WE MIGHT REDUCE USG EXPOSURE TO TERRORISM BY CUTTING BACK ON THE OFFICIAL AMERICAN PRESENCE OVERSEAS. WITH RESPECT TO WESTERN EUROPE, AT LEAST, I BELIEVE WE MUST EXAMINE CAREFULLY THE PREMISE UPON WHICH THIS EXERCISE IS BASED. AMERICA'S GEOPOLITICAL POSITION, ITS CAPACITY TO PROJECT INFLUENCE AT GREAT DISTANCE, RESTS IN LARGE MEASURE UPON OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE IN WESTERN EUROPE AS IF WE WERE OPERATING FROM OUR OWN TERRITORY. THIS APPLIES NOT JUST TO F-111'S BASED IN BRITAIN OR LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OUR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS FROM ITALY. IT APPLIES EQUALLY TO THE DOZENS OF U.S. CIVILIAN AGENCIES AND THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS OPERATING FROM THIS COUNTRY AND OTHERS IN WESTERN EUROPE, WHO ARE ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, LAW ENFORCEMENT, EXPORT PROMOTION, TAX COLLECTION AND MANY OTHER FUNCTIONS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE USG.

5. MUCH OF THIS WORK UNDOUBTEDLY CAN BE DONE FROM THE UNITED STATES AT SOMEWHAT GREATER EXPENSE AND SOMEWHAT LESSENER EFFECTIVENESS. BUT BEFORE WE ASK OURSELVES WHETHER THOSE COSTS ARE WORTH PAYING, WE SHOULD FIRST QUESTION WHETHER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD IN ANY CASE BE PREPARED TO ALLOW TERRORISM TO BECOME A FACTOR IN DECIDING THE SCOPE OF ITS OFFICIAL OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE. IN MY JUDGMENT, WE SHOULD NOT.

6. I WOULD BE THE LAST TO SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD LESSEN PRESSURE UPON WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE TERRORISM SERIOUSLY, OR REDUCE THE SECURITY MEASURES NEEDED TO PROTECT OUR PERSONNEL ABROAD. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT AS WE DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF OUR PRESENCE AND THE COMPOSITION OF OUR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WE NEED TO REMEMBER WHY WE ARE HERE. WE ARE NOT HERE BECAUSE IT IS CHEAPER, EASIER OR MORE PLEASANT TO DO OUR GOVERNMENT'S

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BUSINESS IN WESTERN EUROPE THAN IN THE UNITED STATES. RATHER, WE ARE HERE BECAUSE THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IS THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE EXTERNAL COMPONENT OF AMERICA'S WORLD POWER. WE ARE HERE TO NURTURE THAT RELATIONSHIP AND SUSTAIN THAT POWER. IF BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS REDUCE OUR CAPABILITY TO DO SO, THAT IS A REGRETTABLE BUT NECESSARY PHENOMENON. IT IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR DESIRABLE, IN MY JUDGMENT, THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW TERRORISM TO HAVE A SIMILAR EFFECT.

7. CHARLIE PRICE, JOE RODGERS AND I HAVE EACH PUBLICLY REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND CALLED FOR AMERICANS TO VISIT EUROPE. I BELIEVE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 15344

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BURT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, GE, XT, US

SUBJECT: CAN THE U.S. BE BOMBED OUT OF WESTERN EUROPE? IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IF YOU, AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, COULD FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO PUBLICLY REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC TIE AND TO CALL UPON AMERICANS NOT JUST TO VISIT EUROPE AS TOURISTS, BUT TO CONTINUE, THROUGH COMMERCIAL, PROFESSIONAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL PROFESSIONXX EXCHANGES, TO REINFORCE THIS VITAL RELATIONSHIP. I THINK IT WOULD BE ALSO HELPFUL TO REITERATE THAT AMERICAN FORCES WILL STAY IN EUROPE AS LONG AS THEY ARE NEEDED AND WANTED.

DOBBINS

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T

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NIC 02473-86

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 20 MAY 1986
TO: DDI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: NIO for EUROPE 7E62 CIA Hqs.		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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
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
SECRET/NOFORN

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


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1. Bonn 15344
2. 

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ZCZC 21:10:17Z (ST)
EMI DTG : 86051515534504

SECRET

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NC 0885191
BONN 15344

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PP RUEHC RUEHDD
DE RUFHOL #5344/01 1351405
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151405Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0983
INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
BT

EZ1:

S E C R E T BONN 15344

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 15344

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DOBBINS

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S E C R E T

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